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Abstract: Using a basic currency crisis model, we assess the effectiveness of stock 
prices as a leading indicator of the East Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 1998. Stock 
prices are incorporated into a basic monetary model, through the wealth effect 
postulated by Friedman (1988). In addition to the domestic stock price, we also 
incorporate the stock prices of Hong Kong, China and Japan to determine their ability 
to predict the crisis. Using monthly data, the results indicate that the domestic stock 
price is a significant leading indicator, however the main stock prices indicator of the 
crisis is the Hong Kong stock price. In addition the US price level is also a highly 
significant predictor of the crisis. Causality tests suggest evidence of bi-causality 
between the stock markets and  foreign exchange markets. 
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I Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to primarily determine whether the domestic stock market 
can be used as a leading indicator during a regional currency crisis, as in East Asia 
during 1997 and 1998. Further we investigate whether the major stock markets within 
East Asia had any effect on the currencies suffering the crisis and can also be used as 
an early warning system. A particular feature of the East Asian crisis was the almost 
simultaneous decline in asset prices and currencies, as international investors moved 
their capital out of the respective domestic markets. This resulted in a subsequent 
depreciation of the exchange rate as the domestic currency was sold. However the 
degree of severity of the crisis varied across East Asia, as did the extent of the decline 
in the domestic stock markets. 
 
 To date most models for predicting currency crises have concentrated on leading 
indicators from either the banking sector or the current account (e.g., Kaminsky et al., 
1998, Kwack, 2001). When stock prices have been included, it has been limited to 
only domestic stock prices. In this paper we suggest a simple monetary based model, 
in which stock prices can be incorporated as a leading indicator of currency crises. 
We also investigate whether foreign stock prices are a significant leading indicator, 
based on three theories concerning the origins of the South East Asian currency crisis.  
 
 When investigating the relationship between stock prices and exchange rates, the 
main concern is usually over the direction of causality between these variables. There 
are theoretical reasons for causality to run in both directions, as suggested by 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and Granger et al (2000). The empirical 
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evidence is equally ambiguous, although Granger et al (2000) finds evidence of 
causality running from stock markets to exchange rates during a currency crisis, but 
their study uses daily data rather than monthly data. In this study we too assume 
causality is from stock prices to exchange rates. 
 
 Following the introduction, we assess the interrelationship between stock prices and 
exchange rates during a currency crisis. We then derive a simple model of currency 
crises, in which stock markets are incorporated through the demand for money 
function. The next section describes the data and assesses the results from the 
empirical models. Finally we give our conclusions and suggest some implications for 
future policies. 
 
 
 
 
II Currency Crises and Stock Prices 
 
 The main attempt to incorporate the domestic stock market into empirically based 
currency crisis models has been Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky et al 
(1998). These models incorporate a number of real, financial and political variables in 
purely empirical models, to identify which are significant and also the length of the 
signalling horizon. They use the “signals” approach, which in general involves a one 
step ahead probability of a devaluation, in the context of a multivariate probit or logit 
type model. The domestic stock markets are generally found to be a significant 
leading indicator of currency crises, over a number of different currency crises in the 
recent past. In the study by Kaminsky et al. (1998), stock prices are found to be the 
fourth best predictor of currency crises.  
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  There has been a certain amount of debate in the literature as to the direction of 
causality between stock prices and exchange rates. Granger et al. (2000) show that 
causality runs from domestic stock prices to exchange rates. They offer some 
theoretical support for a bi-directional relationship between the stock market and 
foreign exchange market, but only over the short run. They argue that a change in 
exchange rates would change the market value of all firms that trade internationally. 
This would depend on whether the firms are net importers or exporters, such that if in 
aggregate most firms were net exporters, a devaluation would have a beneficial affect 
on those firms profitability and therefore stock market value. This causal relationship 
is termed the traditional approach, although it does not specify the sign of the effect. 
 
 In contrast to this approach, both Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and 
Granger et al. (2000) stress the importance of the portfolio approach to analysing the 
relationship between stock prices and exchange rates. This suggests that a rise in 
stock prices, increases the domestic wealth of investors, facilitating a rise in the 
demand for money. Following the consequent rise in interest rates, capital is attracted 
into the domestic economy appreciating the domestic currency. This approach 
assumes there is a negative relationship between stock prices and exchange rates, 
with causality running from the stock market to the foreign exchange market. Wu 
(2001) provides evidence of the negative relationship between equities and exchange 
rates in South East Asia. This explanation is the most relevant to this relationship 
during a currency crisis. We have conducted a set of Granger causality tests between 
domestic stock prices and exchange rates, as with other studies, there is evidence of 
bicausality between the stock market and foreign exchange markets. When causality 
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runs from stock prices to the exchange rate, there is a negative relationship, which 
suggests the portfolio approach is most important in South East Asia. 
 
 Apart from the US stock market, we have investigated whether the crisis could have 
originated from any of the main neighbouring stock markets, in Japan, Hong Kong 
and China. Although the crisis began in Thailand in 1997, others have suggested the 
crisis began earlier than this, with both China/ Hong Kong and Japan being suggested 
as contenders. Fernald et al (1999) have suggested that the rise in China’s economic 
strength during the 1990’s added to the crisis. They focused on the 1994 devaluation 
and subsequent strong export performance as the cause of the troubles, as China 
captured export markets, which had previously been dominated by the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. This facilitated current account 
problems, reduced company profitability and culminated in the general financial 
demise of the area. It has also been argued that a further source of the crisis could 
have been Hong Kong, which in 1997 was officially returned to China from the UK. 
Initially this had a positive effect on Hong Kong’s share prices, but as the date for the 
handover approached, so concern about investment in Hong Kong increased. 
 
 Some argue that another source of the crisis was Japan. Following rapid rises in the 
stock market during the 1980’s, the early and mid 1990’s saw a reversal of this trend, 
with some sharp falls. At the same time the Japanese economy experienced an era of 
stagnant growth and lack of demand. This facilitated a decline in demand for ASEAN 
imports and a fall in investment flows to these countries. The financial crisis in Japan 
culminated in the failure of Yamaichi corporation in 1997, the fourth largest financial 
institution. This in turn caused another large fall in the Japanese stock market. 
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  If either Japan or China/ Hong Kong were the instigators of this crisis, then a 
measure of their financial troubles could be a useful leading indicator for the currency 
crises in East Asia. To determine if this is the case, we have incorporated the stock 
market indices of China, Hong Kong and Japan into the basic monetary based model, 
along with the domestic stock market index. 
 
III Model 
 
 The following model is based on the Krugman (1979) model of currency crisis, with 
stock market effects incorporated through the money demand specification. As with 
Edin and Vredin (1993), this is only used as a basis for the empirical investigation 
and as with the leading indicator literature in general, other leading indicators are also 
incorporated into the empirical tests, without specific theoretic modeling. The stock 
market is included in the money demand function2 for three reasons, as suggested by 
Friedman (1988). It primarily acts as a wealth effect, as a rise in stock prices 
increases nominal wealth. Additionally a rise in stock prices reflects a rise in 
expected returns from risky assets. To offset this rise in risk, agents switch away from 
long-term bonds to safer monetary assets. Thirdly a rise in stock prices implies a rise 
in financial transactions and thus transactional demand for money. These imply a 
positive relationship between money and stock prices. There could also be a negative 
relationship through a substitution effect. As stock prices rise, agents substitute the 
                                                          
2 The stock market could have been related to other macroeconomic variables, such as consumption, 
output and investment. However given the monetary basis of most currency crisis models, we have 
incorporated it into the money demand function. 
 6
more attractive equities for money. However as with Friedman (1988) we assume the 
positive effect dominates. 
 
  As with the conventional monetary model, we assume purchasing power parity 
(PPP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP) 3hold; 
 
          (1) e p pt t  *t
 
Where, e is the exchange rate, p are domestic prices and p* are foreign prices. 
 
  E
de
dt
i it t( )
*         (2) 
 
 Where i are domestic interest rates and i*are foreign rates. Money demand takes the 
following form: 
 
  m p y i st t t t t                             (3) 
 
 Where m is domestic money balances, y is domestic income and s is a domestic stock 
market index. We have assumed that the domestic money supply is purely 
accommodating.  By rearranging the above equations, we get:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
3 As with currency crisis models in general based on the monetary model, we have assumed PPP and 
UIP, although empirical studies question whether the former holds due to trade impediments and 
transport costs and the latter due to the presence of a risk premium. 
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dt
desypime ttttt
  **      (4) 
 
To test for the effects of stock prices on the exchange rate, we have chosen a standard 
empirical model, based on equation4 (4). This suggests the crisis is a function of: 
 
 ),,,*,*,,,( xsresrerdspiymfcc      (5) 
 
Where cc is the rate of change in the exchange rate for the month when the exchange 
rate is in a crisis condition,Δ m is the domestic money supply (M1), y is output, i* is 
the US interest rate, p* is the US price level, ds is the domestic stock market index, 
rer is the change in the real exchange rate, res are foreign currency reserves and xs 
are the relevant foreign stock market indexes (All variables are in logs and in change 
form). As with Edin and Vredin (1993) we have also included the real exchange rate, 
rather than the nominal exchange rate and added foreign exchange reserves. The 
relevant foreign stock market indexes are the US, Japan, Hong Kong and China. The 
US stock market is included because the East Asian currencies are pegged to the 
dollar, the Japanese markets have traditionally had a strong effect on the region as a 
whole. China has recently undergone important political changes which have affected 
                                                          
4 An alternative approach would have been to include a variety of other relevant variables relating to 
the banking sector, current account and political factors, as in Kaminsky et al. (1998). However in 
order to provide a theoretical basis for the empirical tests, the emphasis is on variables relating to the 
Friedman based monetary model. In addition it would not be possiblt to incorporate all the potential 
leading indicators into the model, so we have concentrated on the stock market area. 
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their financial markets and Hong Kong has been transferred from UK to Chinese 
control. 
 
 In addition to the main leading indicator tests, we have also included some Granger 
Causality tests, between the exchange rates and domestic stock prices. In addition we 
have included some causality tests between the exchange rates and foreign stock price 
variables. The basic tests is: 
 
 
tititit
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usee


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

     (6) 
 
 Where e is the exchange rate, s is the stock price variable and u and v are error terms. 
As with Blomstrom et al. (1996) we have included country dummy variables and use 
the t-statistic on the lagged explanatory variable to determine if there is evidence of 
causality. 
 
 IV Data and Results 
 
The countries included in the investigation are those that experienced the worst 
problems during the crisis. This includes Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. The data is all monthly, running from January 1996 to December 
1999, so including months where a crisis was evident as well as months in which the 
exchange rate was relatively stable. The exchange rate is expressed as the domestic 
currency in terms of the US dollar, the foreign explanatory variables are the 
respective US variables. This reflects the fact that the relevant currencies were 
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initially all in effect pegged to the US dollar. The data on prices, foreign exchange 
reserves, money supply and interest rates are taken from International Financial 
Statistics and  Datastream..  
 
 The stock market data consists of the total return expressed in index form as supplied 
by Datastream. This incorporates both the capital gain and dividend5 payment. In 
addition to the standard currency crisis variables and the domestic stock market 
indices, we have also added stock market variables from the surrounding countries. 
This includes Hong Kong, China and Japan, where the origins of the crisis are 
believed to have began, as well as the US stock market variable. 
 
 The causality tests are reported in Table 1, where there is evidence of bi-causality 
between the exchange rate and domestic stock prices, as found in Kwack (2000). In 
addition there is evidence that the stock prices in China and particularly Japan cause 
the East Asian exchange rates. 
 
                                                          
5 Friedman suggests using a stock market index such as the main market index in his 1988 paper. 
However other studies have suggested using the return on equities and the dividend yield as an 
alternative measure of the stock market. By using the Datastream index of stock prices, it includes the 
capital gain, whilst the dividend yield is incorporated into the index in the form of a further capital 
gain. 
 
 10
A binomial probit6 is used to estimate the various models, where we define a crisis as 
a depreciation of the currency in any month greater than 2%. This roughly equates 
with the definition of a currency crisis given by Frankel and Rose (1996), which is a 
depreciation of the exchange rate greater than 25% in any given  year7 so the 
dependent variable is the change in the exchange rate. Other values were also 
estimated, but made little difference to the results. The model has been estimated 
using both fixed and random effects, however in all tests there are no significant 
differences between the results, so only the fixed effects are reported. 
 
 The first model to be estimated is the basic model, in which the variables are lagged 
once, incorporating only domestic stock prices. The result is presented in Table 2 and 
suggests the domestic stock prices and US prices are significant leading indicators, 
although other domestic variables are insignificant8 Other lag lengths were also 
                                                          
6 The use of the probit econometric technique in the currency crisis literature is widespread but has a 
number of associated weaknesses. It tends to lead to a limited definition of a currency crisis and does 
not take into account the complicated and individual nature of a crisis. Other studies have used the 
endogenous switching type of model (Edin and Vredin, 1993). However this type of model was not 
suitable for the East Asian financial crisis, as following the devaluations the financial regime changed, 
with the exchange rate floating and capital controls reinstated. 
 
7 We could have used various different definitions of a currency crisis, by incorporating movements in 
reserves and interest rates into a crisis variable. As we are concentrating specifically on the exchange 
rate and stock price relationship, we used only the exchange rate in our crisis variable. Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) use a similar technique to that used here, however they define the crisis as being a sharp 
shift from a capital inflow to outflow. 
 
8 As with other studies of the East Asian financial crisis, the domestic variables are not significant 
leading indicators of the crisis. However we assume that they are significant out of the crisis. 
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added, but were not significant as financial markets tend to adjust relatively quickly. 
The second model incorporates US stock prices, which are not significant, suggesting 
although the US real economy affected the crisis, the US stock prices are not a good 
leading indicator. In models 3 and 4, reserves and the Thailand stock price are 
included in the basic model. As with other studies reserves are not significant 
although the Thailand stock price is significant at the 10% level of significance This 
is not surprising as the crisis began with the collapse of the Thailand stock market.. 
 
 Only US prices and domestic stock prices are  significant leading indicators of the 
currency crisis. The domestic variables are not important predictors of the crisis, 
including the change in the real exchange rate, which as in Radelet and Sachs (1998) 
is insignificant. This result tends to support the contention of many observers who 
suggest there were very few domestic indicators of the impending crisis in these 
economies (e.g., Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998)).  
 
 The further inclusion of the Japanese, Chinese and Hong Kong stock prices 
individually into the model, also shows these are significant, except the Japanese 
stock market, which supports the theory that the origins of the currency crisis was not 
the relatively small domestic stock markets, but the more powerful stock markets of 
some of the neighbouring economies, particularly Hong Kong. All three stock 
markets are negatively signed, again suggesting that the falls in the respective 
markets precipitated the currency crisis. The probability of predicting an outcome 
correctly is reasonably high at about 70%9 in each case. 
                                                          
9 However this is an in-sample forecast. Using an out-of-sample forecast, as is usually the case with 
policy makers, is likely to lead to a smaller probability of correctly predicting a crisis. 
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  The final set of tests involves all three neighbouring stock markets included in the 
model. Only the Hong Kong market is significant of the three main East Asian 
markets. This provides possible evidence that the source of the instability within the 
ASEAN countries was Hong Kong’s financial markets. The instability in these 
markets was caused primarily by the change in ownership of Hong Kong in 1997, 
when China took over administrative control from the UK. However Hong Kong did 
not suffer from a currency crisis itself, this may be due to the larger size and greater 
development of its financial markets as suggested by Radelet and Sachs (1998) or due 
to the authorities using their reserves to purchase equities, thus preventing a collapse 
on the Hang Seng. 
 
V Conclusion 
 
This paper provides evidence of the domestic stock market being a significant leading 
indicator of the recent East Asian currency crisis, unlike other domestic variables. 
Although the most significant leading indicator of the crisis was US prices. The 
effectiveness of the domestic stock prices is less powerful as a leading indicator than 
the stock prices of the main economies in East Asia, particularly that of Hong Kong.  
 
 The results in general support the evidence from other similar studies on the East 
Asian crisis, as there is little evidence that the domestic fundamentals could have 
been used to predict the crisis. However it could have been possible to predict the 
crisis with reasonable accuracy, based on the main neighbouring foreign stock 
markets, particularly the Hong Kong stock market. This implies that volatility in the 
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Hong Kong economy and financial markets, possibly as a result of the change in 
ownership of Hong Kong in 1997, may have triggered the crisis. This supports the 
various contagion theories, although it does not explain why some financial markets 
survived the crisis better than others. 
 
 Finally, although this model could act as an important early warning system, it has a 
number of limitations. These mainly relate to the individual nature of most crises, 
where different institutional and political factors affect the crises in different ways. 
However the intervention in the Hong Kong stock market by the authorities during 
the crisis, may have saved Hong Kong from a similar fate to its neighbours and 
provides the possibility of a mechanism for preventing such crises from occurring in 
the future. This could form part of an area for future research, as could the use of 
daily rather than monthly data as such data becomes more available. 
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Table 1. Causality tests between Stock prices and Exchange rates. 
 
 Δe Δds 
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Δe(-1) 
Δds(-1) 
ΔHKS(-1) 
 
-0.087 (1.674)** 
-0.074 (1.159) 
0.182 (1.916)** 
ΔUSS(-1) 
ΔCHS(-1) 
ΔJPS(-1) 
0.070 (0.499) 
-0.076 (1.683)** 
-0.209 (1.927)** 
 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. E and ds are the 
domestic exchange rate and stock price respectively. 
HKS, USS, CHS and JPS and Hong Kong, US, China 
and Japan’s stock prices respectively. ** indicates 
significance at the 10% level of significance. Only 
lagged explanatory variable included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Probit Models using panel data from Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Philippines and Indonesia 
 17
Variable 1  2 3  4 
ΔM (-1) 
 
ΔDS (-1) 
 
ΔUSP (-1) 
-1.157 
(1.709) 
-0.620* 
(2.363) 
-107.181* 
(11.195) 
-1.136 
 (1.681) 
-0.585* 
(2.186) 
-1.3.874*  
(9.488) 
-1.095 
(1.596) 
-0.572* 
(2.170) 
-102.311* 
(9.916) 
-1.131 
(1.442) 
-0.320 
(0.847) 
-110.289* 
(10.234) 
ΔUSS (-1) 
 
USi (-1)  
 
ΔY (-1) 
 
 
0.064 
(0.308) 
-0.608 
(1.312) 
-0.393 
 (0.615) 
0.073  
(0.351) 
-0.629 
(1.363) 
 
 
0.007 
(0.032) 
-0.708 
(1.514) 
 
 
0.057 
(0.240) 
-0.636 
(1.253) 
ΔRER (-1) 
 
ΔRES (-1) 
 
ΔTHS(-1) 
0.283 
(0.807) 
0.281 
(0.807) 
0.206 
(0.577)  
-0.796 
(1.453) 
0.090 
(0.232) 
 
 
-0.471 
(1.651) 
L-L 
Probability 
-122.031 
70% 
-121.841 
71% 
-120.956 
73% 
-97.229 
68% 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Probability is the probability of a predicted 
outcome occurring from the 115 possible outcomes, acting as a pseudo-R2. M is the 
money supply, DS is the domestic stock price, USP, Usi and USS are US prices, 
interest rates and stock prices respectively. Y is output and THS are Thailand’s stock 
prices, RER is the real exchange rate and RES are reserves. L-L is the restricted log 
likelihood A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Probit Models using panel data from Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Philippines and Indonesia, including foreign stock prices. 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 
ΔM (-1) 
 
ΔDS (-1) 
 
ΔUSP (-1) 
-1.061 
(1.596) 
-0.445 
(1.668) 
-107.643* 
(12.306) 
-1.129 
(1.665) 
-0.500 
(1.860) 
-109.676* 
(11.680) 
-1.116 
(1.655) 
-0.594 
(2.265) 
-106.075* 
(11.008) 
-1.071 
(1.609) 
-0.476 
(1.747) 
-116.063* 
(10.558) 
ΔUSS (-1) 
 
USi (-1) 
 
ΔY (-1) 
 
 
0.041 
(0.188) 
-0.573 
(1.266) 
 
 
0.082 
(0.391) 
-0.535 
 (1.150) 
 
 
0.110 
(0.519) 
-0.683 
(1.450) 
1.069* 
(1.224) 
0.064 
(0.278) 
-0.578 
(1.234) 
ΔRER (-1) 
 
ΔJPS (-1) 
 
ΔCHS (-1) 
0.040 
(0.114) 
 
0.175 
(0.500) 
 
 
-0.493* 
(2.292) 
0.253 
(0.718) 
-0.602* 
(1.093) 
-0.035 
(0.097) 
-0.512 
(0.820) 
-0.047 
(0.164) 
ΔHKS (-1) 
 
L-L 
Prob 
-0.974* 
(3.072) 
-117.412 
72% 
 
 
-119.494 
72% 
 
 
-121.431 
 71% 
-1.141* 
(2.234) 
-116.428 
73% 
Notes: See Table 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
